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THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY *
T HERE IS WIDESPREAD DISSATISFACTION with the judi-
cial takeover of functions confided by the Constitution to the
states and the people.1 Many resent increasing judicial interven-
tion in matters such as housing 2 and the administration of schools.3
Others are concerned with intrusions in the name of affirmative
action. 4 Some are perturbed by judicial administration of prisons
which in effect supplants legislative discretion in making budgetary
allocations." Still others decry interference with local control of
pornography,6 abortions, 7 and the administration of criminal jus-
tice.' The people reluctanly obey such decrees because they are
told so the Constitution requires. But what if the requirements
are imposed by Justices rather than the Constitution? In his re-
cently published autobiography, the late Justice William 0. Doug-
las recounts Chief Justice Hughes' advice that "ninety percent of
any [constitutional] decision is emotional. The rational part of
us supplies the reasons for supporting our predilections." 9 Then
and there Justice Douglas admitted that "the 'gut' reaction of a
judge at the level of constitutional adjudication, dealing with the
vagaries of due process, freedom of speech, and the like, was the
main ingredient of his decision." "I Why should many millions of
Americans prefer the gut reactions of the Justices against death
penalties," for example, to their own attachment to death penal-
ties? 12 Under democratic principles, that gut reaction is no sub-
stitute for the will of the people. "The most immediate constitu-
tional crisis of our present time," Professor Philip Kurland has
written, is "the usurpation by the judiciary of general governmental
powers on the pretext that its authority derives from the Fourteenth
*The substance of the text of this article was presented as an address by
Professor Berger at the Villanova University School of Law on October 29, 1980.
Professor Berger is the author of an array of books and articles focusing on the
historical role and functions of the Supreme Court and its interrelation with
the other branches of government. The following is a partial list of his most
recent publications: GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969);
"Government by Judiciary": Judge Gibbons' Argument Ad Hominem, 59 B.U.
L. REv. 783 (1979); The Fourteenth Amendment: Light From the Fifteenth,
74 Nw. U. L. REV. 311 (1979); The Fourteenth Amendment: The Framers'
Design, 30 S.C. L. REv. 495 (1979); Bills of Attainder: A Study of Amendment
by the Court, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 355 (1978).
The reference notes which follow the text were prepared by the staff of
the Villanova Law Review and are set apart to distinguish them from Pro-
fessor Berger's work.
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Amendment." 13 That is not understood by the people, nor in-
deed by most lawyers. Before any steps can profitably be taken to
restore government to the people, they must be instructed in the
historical facts.
At the height of Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1937 Court-packing
campaign, 4 then Professor Felix Frankfurter wrote to the President:
People have been taught to believe that when the Su-
preme Court speaks it is not they who speak but the Con-
stitution, whereas, of course, in so many vital cases, it is
they who speak and not the Constitution. And I verily
believe that is what the country needs most to under-
stand.15
Robert Bork, former Solicitor General, observed that "[t]he Su-
preme Court regularly insists that its results ... do not spring from
the mere will of the Justices in the majority but are supported,
indeed compelled, by a proper understanding of the Constitution.
. . .Value choices are attributed to the Founding Fathers, not to
the Court." 16 Were the people to understand that it is the Jus-
tices, not the Constitution, who require busing and affirmative
action, govern abortion, and impose limitations on state adminis-
tration of criminal justice, they would remedy the usurpation.
Judicial usurpation can readily be demonstrated by the re-
apportionment 17 and desegregation "I decisions, for the framers un-
mistakably intended to exclude segregation and suffrage from the
scope of the fourteenth amendment.'9 Justice Harlan justly af-
firmed that the Warren Court's "one person-one vote" interpreta-
tion was made "in the face of irrefutable and still unanswered his-
tory to the contrary." 20 Harlan's demonstration that suffrage was
excluded, wrote Professor Louis Lusky, an apologist for an activist
Court, is "irrefutable and unrefuted." 21 A fellow activist, Professor
Nathaniel Nathanson, agrees 22 and adds that Alexander Bickel
"quite conclusively" demonstrated that segregation was likewise
excluded,23 and that "Berger's independent research and analysis
confirms and adds weight" to those conclusions.24 It is a mistake to
read our views as to segregation back into the minds of the framers
of the fourteenth amendment. For them, as Bickel observed, "It
was preposterous to worry about unsegregated schools, for example,
when hardly a beginning had been made at educating Negroes at
all and when obviously special efforts, suitable only for the Negroes,
would have to be made." 25 The Indiana Constitution actually for-
bade the immigration of Negroes into the State.2 6 Writing in
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August, 1866, after submission of the fourteenth amendment to the
ratifiers, Thomas Shearman stated in The Nation that "[t]he mem-
bers from Indiana and Southern Illinois well knew that their
constituents had barely overcome their prejudices sufficiently to tol-
erate even the residence of negroes among them, and that any
greater liberality would be highly repulsive to them." 27
Let me recount a few confirmatory facts as to suffrage. Justice
Brennan noted that only five New England states and New York
allowed Negroes to vote as of 1866, and that voters had rejected the
extension of suffrage in seventeen of nineteen popular referenda
held on the subject between 1865 and 1868. Hence, Roscoe
Conkling, a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
which drafted the fourteenth amendment, stated that it would be
"futile to ask three quarters of the States to do .. .the very thing
which most of them have already refused to do in their own cases." 28
Another member of the committee, Senator Jacob Howard, ex-
plained to the Senate that "three fourths of the States of this Union
could not be induced to vote to grant the right of suffrage, even in
any degree or under any restriction, to the colored race." 29 The
Report of the Joint Committee explained that suffrage was omitted
because "it was doubtful ... whether the States would consent to
surrender a power they had always exercised," and therefore con-
cluded "to leave the whole question with the people of each
State," 30 as section two of the fourteenth amendment clearly shows.
Summing up in 1974, Professor Robert Bork stated: "The prin-
ciple of one man, one vote ... runs counter to the text of the four-
teenth amendment, the history surrounding its adoption and rati-
fication, and the political practice of Americans from colonial times
up to the day the Court invented the new formula." 81 No one
would contend, for example, that Congress or the Court can change
the constitutional provisions for a two-year term in the House to
a four-year term. Is there a better reason to reject the framers'
unmistakable intention to exclude suffrage from the fourteenth
amendment?
Much of the Court's expansion of its powers rests on the se-
lective incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth
amendment. It needs to be recalled that Madison's proposal to make
the free speech provision applicable to the states 82 was voted
down. 3 As late as 1922, the Supreme Court held that the states
were not obliged to confer free speech.84 Much earlier, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall concluded in Barron v. Baltimore 15 that, "[h]ad Con-
gress engaged in the extraordinary occupation of improving the
[VOL. 26: p. 414
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constitutions of the several States by affording the people additional
protection from the exercise of power by their own governments in
matters which concerned themselves alone they would have de-
clared this purpose in plain and intelligible language," 36 for the
founders placed their trust in the states, not in the suspect new-
comer-the remote federal government.8 7 Much the same thing
was said by Justice Miller in 1872 with reference to the privileges
or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment: it did not con-
template the "transfer [of] the security and protection of all the
civil rights which we have mentioned, from the States to the Federal
government?" 38 Justice Miller declined to embrace a construction
that would so subject the States "to the control of Congress" and
so radically change "the whole theory of the relations of the State
and Federal governments to each other and of both these govern-
ments to the people ... in the absence of language which expresses
such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt." 39 Common sense
urges that an electorate which refused to surrender state control of
suffrage 40 would not authorize, sub silentio, federal control of its
local affairs-affairs such as the administration of schools and of
criminal justice, the regulation of obscenity, and the like.
Justice Black sought to lodge the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights into the fourteenth amendment by lodging it in the privi-
leges or immunities clause. 41 That clause was lifted from article
IV of the original Constitution, and self-evidently it did not em-
brace the Bill of Rights, which was added to the Constitution
later.42 The progenitor clause, article IV of the Articles of Con-
federation, recited that it was designed to promote "trade and
commerce; "43 and the successor clause in article IV of the Consti-
tution was thus narrowly construed in early decisions by the state
courts, including Massachusetts. 44  In 1872, when Justice Miller
compared the clauses of article IV and the fourteenth amendment,45
he declared: "There can be but little question that ... the privileges
and immunities intended are the same in each. In the articles of
the Confederation we have some of these specifically mentioned,
and enough perhaps to give some general idea of the class of civil
rights meant by the phrase." 46
The immediate predecessor of the fourteenth amendment
privileges or immunities clause was the civil rights or immunities
clause of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 7 which proceeded in the
Thirty-ninth Congress on a parallel track with the fourteenth
amendment.48 Russell Thayer of Pennsylvania explained to the
framers of the Act that the terms civil rights and immunities were
1980-81]
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limited by the subsequent enumeration of the right to contract, the
right to own property, and the right of access to the courts, saying
"that enumeration precludes any possibility that the general words
which have been used can be extended beyond the particulars which
have been enumerated," 49 a statement echoed by others.50 Even
so, John Bingham, draftsman of the fourteenth amendment, pro-
tested that the terms civil rights and immunities were "oppressive"
and would "embrace every right that pertains to the citizen as
such." 51 In short, he would not prohibit all discriminations.52
To meet Bingham's objections, the phrase was deleted,5 3 as James
Wilson explained, to obviate "the difficulty growing out of any other
construction beyond the specific rights named in the section," 
and to avoid "a latitudinarian construction not intended." 5r No
one has explained why Bingham would then give to privileges or
immunities the unlimited scope he had so vehemently rejected.
As you are aware, the privileges or immunities clause was
gutted by the Slaughter-House Cases56 and has lain dormant for
more than 100 years. In his recent book, Democracy and Distrust,
Professor John Hart Ely seeks to resurrect it, though he finds its
terms inscrutable. 57 The powers reserved to the states by the
tenth amendment are not to be curtained by inscrutable words,
as both Chief Justice Marshall 1s and Justice Miller held.59 I have
dwelt on the privileges or immunities clause because it was the key
clause in the framers' scheme, but the other clauses are little more
helpful to the activist cause.
Due process had a clearly procedural meaning both in 1787
and in 1866. Summing up 400 years of history, Hamilton said in
1787 that due process applied only to judicial proceedings, never
to an act of legislature. 60 Debates on the fourteenth amendment in
the Thirty-ninth Congress reinforce this view.6 The phrase has
now fallen into disrepute, however, because the Court misused it,
applying it to thwart socio-economic reform. If we are to give due
process the meaning it had for the framers, it is without substantive
content, and must be confined to judicial procedure.
Resort to the equal protection clause 62 is a more recent phe-
nomenon, rising into prominence because economic due process had
been discredited. As Professor Herbert Packer observed, "the new
'substantive equal protection' has under a different label permitted
today's justices to impose their prejudices in much the same manner
as the Four Horsemen [of the pre-1937 Court] once did." 63 But to
the framers of the fourteenth amendment, the clause meant only
equal protection of the rights embodied in the privileges or immuni-
[VOL. 26: p. 414
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ties clause by way of the Civil Rights Act, which, it needs to be
underscored, the framers said again and again were "identical." 64
Throughout the debates on the Act, references to equal protection
were in the circumscribed context of the rights enumerated in the
bill. 5 To quote Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio,6 "[w]hatever rights
as to each of these enumerated civil (not political) matters the
States may confer upon one race or color of the citizens shall be
held by all races in equality .... It secures ... equality of pro-
tection in those enumerated civil rights which the States may
deem proper to confer upon any races." 67 Under the pari materia
rule, 8 this meaning is to be given the words in the "identical"
amendment. So it was held by Justice Bradley.69 Moreover, pro-
posals to eliminate all racial distinctions were repeatedly and de-
cisively rejected.70 The Co-chairman of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction, Senator William Fessenden, explained: "[W]e can-
not put into the Constitution, owing to existing prejudices and
existing institutions, an entire exclusion of all class distinc-
tions .... ," 71 Thaddeus Stevens,72 the scourge of the South, sadly
confessed that he had not realized his dream that "no distinction
would be tolerated .... This bright dream has vanished like the
baseless fabric of a vision." 73
Whatever the meanings of the language of the privileges or
immunities and equal protection clauses, they cannot, under long-
established canons, embrace the suffrage and segregation the
framers so unmistakably excluded. Men do not use words to de-
feat their purposes. As Justice Holmes declared, judges may not say
"[w]e see what you are driving at, but you have not said it." 74
For the age-old rule is: the intention of the lawmaker is the law 7>
Whence did the Court derive the power to displace those value
choices of the framers. As late as 1940, we are told by activist
Professor Stanley Kutler, academicians criticized the federal judi-
ciary for "frustrating desirable social policies," 76 for arrogating "a
policymaking function not conferred upon it by the Constitution." 77
Afterwards, he continued, "most of the judiciary's longtime critics
suddenly found a new faith"; 78 now "a new libertarianism promot-
ing 'preferred freedoms' " was matched with "an activist judiciary
to protect those values," 71 an activism which today continues to
hold sway among the intellectual elite. Although I share activist
dislike of malapportionment and segregation, I like it no better, I
wrote in 1942,0 when Justice Black embodies my predilections in
the Constitution "I than when Justice McReynolds g- Co. incor-
porated theirs. s2 Because a given result seems laudable, it does not
1980-81]
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follow that it is constitutional, as the framers 83 and Chief Justice
Marshall 84 long ago pointed out. The test of constitutionality can-
not be whose ox is gored.
A glance at the roots of judicial review will be instructive.
Judicial review was an innovation; it had been asserted in a few
pre-1787 state cases, proceeding for violations of express constitu-
tional provisions, such as trial by jury.s5 None of them represent
a takeover of legislative, let alone constitutional, policy-making.
Even so, a few cases excited stormy disapproval, leading to removal
proceedings,8s because the founders were attached to legislative
paramountcy. As Justice Wilson, a leading architect of the Con-
stitution, explained in his 1791 Philadelphia Lectures,87 the founders
trusted their assemblies because they elected them, whereas they
were saddled with the judiciary by the Crown.8 "Need we be sur-
prised," he asked, that they were objects of aversion and distrust?",
that "every occasion was seized for lessening their influence."
Understandably, Alexander Hamilton assured the ratifiers that, of
the three branches, 'the judiciary is next to nothing.' 89
No specific provision for judicial review is made in the Con-
stitution. Learned Hand,90 Archibald Cox 91 and Leonard Levy 92
consider the evidence that the framers contemplated judicial re-
view inconclusive. The argument for judicial review has largely
been rested on the framers' intention as revealed by the legislative
history.93 If that be relied on to establish the power, it cannot be
discarded as to the powers' scope. The current activist dismissal of
the framers' intention as the guide to meaning of the text would
undermine the very legitimacy of judicial review.
Judicial review was conceived in narrow terms. Participation
in legislative policymaking was categorically rejected by the
framers. It had been proposed to make justices members of a
Council of Revision that would assist the President in exercising
the veto power, on the ground that "[f]aws may be unjust, may be
dangerous ... and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify the
judges in refusing to give them effect." 4 But Elbridge Gerry
objected: "It was quite foreign from the nature of ye office to make
them judges of the policy of public measures." 15 Nathan Gorham
chimed in that judges "are not to be presumed to possess any
peculiar knowledge of the mere policy of public measures." 96
Rufus King added that judges "ought not to be legislators." 97
So judicial participation in policymaking was rejected. Then too,
the Colonists had a profound fear of judicial discretion,9" pungently
expressed by Chief Justice Hutchinson of Massachusetts: "[T]he
420 [VOL. 26: p. 414
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Judge should never be the Legislator: Because then the Will of the
Judge would be the Law; and this tends to a State of Slavery." 99
Montesquieu, the oracle cited constantly in the several conventions,
wrote that if the judge were to be the legislator, the "life and liberty
of the subject would be subject to arbitrary control." 100 Such
were the suppositions the founders brought to fashioning the novel
judicial review.
A cluster of remarks by Alexander Hamilton, the great apolo-
gist for judicial review, has been too little noticed. Echoing Mont-
esquieu, he stated that "there is no liberty, if the power of judging
be not separated from the legislative and executive powers." 101
Having divorced adjudication from legislation, he hardly contem-
plated that legislation would be taken over by the judiciary. In
stead, he wrote that courts may not "on the pretense of a repugnancy
... substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions
of the legislature." 102 That is, they may not intrude within the
boundaries of legislative power, for as James Bradley Thayer, 103
Learned Hand,'0 and Justice James Iredell 105 before them empha-
sized, courts are confined to policing boundaries to insure that the
departments do not overleap their bounds. And Hamilton empha-
sized: "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is in-
dispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and
precedents." 106 Is it conceivable that he would have held judges
were less bound by the unmistakable will of the framers than by
judicial precedents? Hamilton also assured the ratifiers that judges
could be impeached for "deliberate usurpations on the authority of
the legislature." 107 All this testifies that the founders were worried
about the innovative judicial review, and explains why it was con-
ceived in narrow terms from which a takeover of policymaking was
plainly excluded. Distrust of the courts, arising from Dred Scott 108
and the fugitive slave 100 decisions, was repeatedly expressed in the
1866 debates,110 and is evidenced by section five of the fourteenth
amendment, which confided enforcement of the amendment to
Congress, not the courts. 1 'L
It is tempting to comment on a few activist rationalizations
of what Professor Lusky describes as "the Court's new and grander
conception of its own place in the governmental scheme," 112 its
"assertion of the power to revise the Constitution, bypassing the
cumbersome amendment procedure prescribed by Article V," 113
what Alfred Kelly complacently termed a "constitutional equalitar-
ian revolution." 114 But I must be content to note Professor
Mark Tushnet's indication that activist theorizing about the ex-
1980-81]
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panded role of the Court is bankrupt, as is confessed by Professor
Paul Brest's bold pronouncement that "judges and other public
officials [are not] bound by the text or original understanding of
the Constitution," or by the "consent" of those who "are dead and
gone." 115 On such reasoning, we are even less bound by the dead
hand of Earl Warren.
What is to be done to limit judicial intervention? The amend-
ment process is too onerous, requiring agreement among two-thirds
of the Congress and three-quarters of the states. Legislation is
vastly to be preferred, for it may be enacted by a majority of the
legislature, and if vetoed by the President, it can be overridden by
a two-thirds vote.""6 That Congress has the power to limit the juris-
diction of the inferior federal courts is beyond doubt. Very early
in our history the Court held, in Cary v. Curtis,117 that
the judicial power of the United States, although it has
its origin in the Constitution, is . . .dependent for its dis-
tribution . . . entirely upon the action of Congress, who
possess the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior
to the Supreme Court), for the exercise of the judicial
power, and of investing them with jurisdiction either lim-
ited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding, jurisdic-
tion from them . . . .
Federal question jurisdiction was first conferred on the federal
courts by the Civil Rights Act of 1866.119 What Congress dele-
gates, according to Sheldon v. Sill,120 it can withdraw it.121 A with-
drawal of jurisdiction over, for example, busing or affirmative action
cases from the federal courts would dry up one source of appeals
to the Supreme Court.' 22 As to the state courts, Congress from
the beginning, wrote Charles Alan Wright, "has provided that in
certain instances the jurisdiction of the federal courts shall be ex-
clusive of the courts of the several States .... ,, 123 One such in-
stance is the provision of section three of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 that "the district courts of the United States shall have, exclu-
sively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all the crimes
and offenses committed against the provisions of this act." 124 Sec-
tion five of the fourteenth amendment reinforces the lesson of long
precedent, by stating that "Congress shall have power to enforce"
the provisions of the amendment. 125 If the state courts can pro-
ceed in spite of an exclusivity provision, they would take over the
power of enforcement that was confided to Congress. And if neither
[VOL. 26: p. 414
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federal nor state courts may, by virtue of congressional enactment,
determine certain categories of cases, there is no basis for appeals
to the Supreme Court.126
Let us consider the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in light of the article III provision that the appellate jurisdiction
shall be subject to "such Exceptions and under such regulations as
the Congress shall make." 12T Over the years the Supreme Court,
in dicta, has recognized the control of Congress over its jurisdiction,
notably in Ex parte McCardle.128 In 1965, Professor Herbert
Wechsler declared that "Congress has the power by enactment of
a statute to strike at what it deems judicial excess by delimitation of
the jurisdiction of the lower courts and of the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction." 129
Whatever the scope of the appellate jurisdiction clause,13° there
is the import of section five of the fourteenth amendment to con-
sider. Section five provides that "Congress shall have power to en-
force [the amendment]." In 1879 the Court itself emphasized in
Ex parte Virginia,18' that this power was given to Congress, not
the courts. 18 2 Were the Supreme Court to insist upon enforcing
the provisions of the fourteenth amendment against Congress' mani-
fest intention not to do so - it would convert "Congress shall have
power to enforce" into "The Court shall enforce." That would
usurp power that was withheld. For discretion to enforce was left
to Congress; section five does not mandate enforcement; it does not
provide that Congress shall enforce, but that "Congress shall have
power to enforce." This was not mere happenstance. Encroach-
ment on state sovereignty was highly unpopular in the North and
the "have power" formulation, I suggest, was a compromise de-
signed to leave the matter in the hands of Congress. My study of
the fifteenth amendment, 18 3 section two of which is the analog of
section five of the fourteenth, disclosed, in the words of Senator
Oliver Morton, that "the remedy for violation of the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments was expressly not left to the courts .... "
but was to "be enforced by legislation on the part of Congress." 184
Senator John Sherman stated that "before it shall be enforced in
the courts some legislation should be passed by Congress." 135 Sena-
tor Matthew Carpenter argued: "We must legislate, and then com-
mit the enforcement of our laws to the Federal tribunals, not to
the States." 186 Nowhere was it intimated that the Supreme Court
was exempted from the grant to Congress. In fact, section five
sprang from the enduring sense of outrage Dred Scott 187 had in-
spired.188
1980-81]
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Does the due process clause require that a remedy must be pro-
vided on the theory that no one may be deprived of a right without
trial? Passing the question whether a "right" can be claimed in
spite of the framer's intention, for example, to exclude segregation
from the scope of the fourteenth amendment, the issue is whether
the framers meant the due process clause of section one to take
precedence over the enforcement provision of section five. To re-
quire a judicial trial against the will of Congress is to lodge the
enforcement power in the courts in spite of the specific grant to
Congress. That deprives section five of its intended effect. The
due process clause, to my mind, must be regarded as subordinate
to section five, for the framers left to Congress the judgment
whether any trial would be available. To it was left the power of
enforcement.
REFERENCE NOTES
The following notes were prepared by the staff of the Villanova
Law Review to supplement Professor Berger's lecture and are in-
tended to serve as a research aid for our readers, not as a representa-
tion of the views of Professor Berger which are extensively docu-
mented in his works.
The Editors wish to express their appreciation to Douglas J.
Smillie, Anne P. Stark, and Michael D. Venuti for their research
assistance.
I. See P. KURLAND, POLMCS, THE CONsTrrUTIoN AND THE WARREN COURT
95 (1970).
2. See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (requiring HUD to
make up for past discriminatory housing practices in Chicago by providing
housing alternatives outside the city limits); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) (holding that state judicial enforcement of racially discriminatory restric-
tive covenants on property is prohibited by the equal protection clause of the
Constitution).
3. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)
(upholding a federal court's plan to remedy past racial discrimination in the
school system which included pairing and grouping of schools, and busing of
children); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (rejecting a school
board's freedom-of-choice plan to remedy segregation as an ineffective way to
achieve a unitary system); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. [Brown II], 349 U.S. 294
(1955) (implementing the Brown I desegregation decision by allowing for
broad remedial powers in the federal courts to dismantle the dual system);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. [Brown I], 347 U.S. 438 (1954) (rejecting the doctrine
of "separate but equal" and mandating desegregation of public schools). See
also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
For school prayer decisions, see Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
4. For cases reviewing the benign use of sex classifications in affirmative
action programs, see Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 100 S. Ct. 1540
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(1980); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313
(1977). For decisions involving the benign use of racial classifications in affirma-
tive action programs, see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980); Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
5. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (requiring prisons to provide
law libraries for inmates); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (concerning the
medical needs of prisoners); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I.
1977), remanded, 599 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding several aspects of prison
management defective and mandating specific changes); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F.
Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) aff'd in part and remanded in part sub nom.
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977) (establishing minimum
constitutional standards applicable to Alabama prisons).
6. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
7. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (holding parental consent re-
quirement of Massachusetts abortion law unconstitutional); Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (invalidating provisions of a post-Roe abortion
statute); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (striking down substantial portions
of Georgia state abortion law); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding Texas
abortion laws unconstitutional). See generally Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf:
A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
8. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (applying the fifth amend-
ment guarantee against double jeopardy to state criminal trials); Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (imposing an obligation on state courts to meet
certain requirements in their acceptance of a guilty plea); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1969) (outlining procedural safeguards to be followed in custodial
interrogation); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule
to the states). For decisions dealing with sixth amendment right to counsel,
see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
355 (1963). One commentator has stated that "[t]he Court's 'coddling' of
criminals became a major issue in the 1968 elections; new appointees to the
Court after Warren's retirement were selected in part on their hostility to
'criminal forces.'" G. WHITE, Tim AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 364-65 (1976).
9. W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975 8 (1980) (emphasis added).
10. Id.
11. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (invalidating
North Carolina's mandatory death sentence for a specific category of homicide
offenses); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that the death
sentence could not be imposed under sentencing procedures involving a sub-
stantial risk of arbitrary or capricious application).
12. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Justice Stewart, writing
for the majority in Gregg, acknowledged that a large segment of American
society still regards the death penalty as "an appropriate and necessary criminal
sanction." Id. at 179. Chief Justice Warren commented that the death penalty
has been employed throughout our history, is widely accepted, and cannot be
said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 99 (1958).
13. Letter from Philip Kurland to Harvard University Press (Aug. 15, 1977).
14. In 1937, after several New Deal laws were held unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court, Franklin Roosevelt submitted a court reorganization plan in
the form of a bill which authorized the President to nominate new judges for
each federal judge who did not retire or resign within six months of his seven-
tieth birthday. The bill also called for a limit of fifteen members on the
Supreme Court. At the time, there were six Supreme Court Justices over 70.
The Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that the bill was a dangerous
abandonment of constitutional principle and emphatically rejected it. See
12
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generally J. ALsoPs & T. CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938); L. BAKER, BACK TO
BACK-THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME COURT (1967).
15. ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE 1928-1945 383
(M. Freedman ed. 1967) (emphasis in original).
16. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 3-4 (1971).
17. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962). One commentator stated: "No cases in modern times have more sharply
provoked such disagreement [regarding the propriety of judicial review] than
the congressional districting and state legislative reapportionment cases." Auer-
bach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote - One Vote, One
Value, 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 2.
18. See note 3 supra.
19. Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light from the Fifteenth, 74 Nw.
U. L. REV. 311 (1979).
20. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in the judgment); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 615 (1964)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan's dissent included a thorough examina-
tion of the historical materials bearing on the fourteenth amendment. Id. at
589-632 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
21. Lusky, Government by Judiciary: What Price Legitimacy?, 6 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 403, 406 (1979).
22. See Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEx. L. REV. 579, 580-81 (1978).
23. Id. at 581, citing Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segrega-
tion Decision, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1955). Bickel's conclusions were first ad-
vanced in a memorandum that he prepared as Justice Frankfurter's law clerk
when Brown v. Board of Education was pending before the Court. Nathanson,
supra note 22, at 581.
24. Nathanson, supra note 22, at 581.
25. Letter from Alexander Bickel to Justice Frankfurter (Aug. 1953), quoted
in R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 654 (1976). Bickel further stated that "[i]n any
event, it is impossible to conclude that the 39th Congress intended that segre-
gation be abolished; impossible also to conclude that they foresaw it might be,
under the language they were adopting." KLUGER, supra, at 654.
26. IND. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (1851). Along with the prohibition against
immigration, the Indiana Constitution denied suffrage to Negroes and mulattoes.
IND. CONST. art. II §§ 2, 5 (1851). According to Senator Hendricks, an Indiana
Democrat during the 39th Congress, "[i]n the State of Indiana we do not recog-
nize the civil equality of the races." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 602
(1866) [hereinafter cited as 39th CONG. GLOBE].
27. 6 C. Fairman, History of the Supreme Court 1283 n.246 (1971).
28. 39th CONG. GLOBE, supra note 26, at 358.
29. Id. at 2766.
30. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 84 (1977) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT BY JUDI-
CIARY], quoting Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, S. REP. No.
112, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1866).
31. Bork, supra note 16, at 18, citing Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Ass'y.,
377 U.S. 713, 744 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 589 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 187, 266 (1962)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
32. See Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 433-35 (1926). Madison included in the proposed draft
of the Bill of Rights, the following: "No State shall violate the equal rights of
conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases."
Id. at 434. In the House debates which followed proposal of this amendment,
opponents expressed the concern that state governments should be left to them-
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selves and that any more interference with the states would be ill-conceived.
Id.
33. Id. at 435. Madison's proposed amendment, in a slightly altered form,
was passed by the House but struck down by the Senate. Warren points out
that the "House later concurred with the Senate's action." Id.
34. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 538 (1922).
35. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). The Court in Barron rejected the peti-
tioner's claim based on eminent domain, holding that the fifth amendment
operated as a restraint on the federal government and was not applicable to
the states.
36. Id. at 250.
37. Id. Chief Justice Marshall noted that "the great revolution which
established the Constitution of the United States, was not effected without im-
mense opposition." Id. at 249. The people feared that the powers deemed
essential to union "might be exercised in a manner dangerous to liberty." Id.
Thus, "[t]hese amendments demanded security against the apprehended en-
croachments of the general government - not against those of the local govern-
ments." Id.
38. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77-78 (1872). In rejecting
the petitioner's argument in that case, the Court implicitly answered Justice
Miller's rhetorical question in the negative. Id. at 73-75.
39. Id. at 78.
40. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text supra.
41. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dis-
senting). In Adamson, Justice Reed, writing for the majority, refused to extend
the fifth amendment prohibition against compelled testimony to protect against
state action through the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 51. Justice Black's
dissent, including an appendix tracing the history of the fourteenth amendment,
outlined his theory that the language of the amendment was thought, by both
those who sponsored it and those who opposed its submission and passage, to
guarantee that the Bill of Rights would be applicable to the states. Id. at 68-
123. Alexander Bickel recounts that Black's dissent "aroused much interest and
provoked new scholarship. Within two years, Professor Charles Fairman had
conclusively disproved Justice Black's contention; at least such in the weight of
opinion among disinterested observers." A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 102 (1962), citing Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorpo-
rate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
42. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. The first ten amendments, forming the
Bill of Rights, were ratified December 15, 1791.
43. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV. For the text of article IV, see
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN
STATES 28 (1927) (prepared by the Library of Congress pursuant to a joint
resolution by the 69th Congress providing for the compilation and printing of
pertinent historical documents in commemoration of the 150th anniversary of
the Declaration of Independence). Article IV also proclaimed the intent to
"secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people
of the different states" and provided that "the people of each state shall have
free ingress and regress to and from any other state." Id.
44. Abbot v. Bayley, 23 Mass. (6 Pick), 89, 90-93 (1827).
45. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75 (1872).
46. Id.
47. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. Section one of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 guaranteed to all persons born in the United States, except untaxed
Indians, the right "to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens." Section two
constituted the criminal enforcement provision of the Act. For the modern
14
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counterparts of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, see 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976); 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1976).
48. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction began its formulation of the
fourteenth amendment while the Senate was passing the Civil Rights Act, but
before the House had considered it. See Bickel, supra note 23, at 29.
49. 39th CONG. GLOBE, supra note 26, at 1151.
50. The proposed draft of § I of the Civil Rights Act began with the words
"that there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities." During
the opening debate on the Act, Senator Trumbull was asked what was meant
by "civil rights?" He responded by reading the enumeration of the rights in
§ 1. See id. at 476; note 47 supra. According to Alexander Bickel, those "who
spoke in favor of the bill were content to rest on the points Trumbull had
made[,]" and the "rights to be secured by the bill were those specifically enu-
merated in § 1." Bickel, supra note 23, at 13.
51. 39th CONG. GLOBE, supra note 26, at 1291.
52. Id. at 1291-93. Bingham observed that virtually all states in the Union
made some discrimination on the basis of race or color respecting civil rights
and questioned the power of Congress to cure such discrimination. He con-
tended that the proposal as drafted with the language concerning civil rights
and immunities would make it a "penal offense for the judges of the States to
obey the constitution and laws of their States . . . . ' Id. at 1293.
53. See Bickel, supra note 23, at 28. Thus, the Act as passed began with
the words: "that all persons born in the United States and not subject to any
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens
of the United States" and thereafter listed the enumerated rights. See note 47
supra. Cf. note 50 supra (deleted language).
54. 39th CONG. GLOBE, supra note 26, at 1367.
55. Id. at 1366.
56. See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). Dissenting Justice Field lamented
that the majority's construction of the privileges and immunities clause rendered
it a "vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most un-
necessarily excited Congress and the people on its passage." Id. at 96 (Field,
J., dissenting).
57. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 22-30 (1980). Ely suggests in-
corporation of a broad and flexible range of protections, calling the privileges
or immunities clause the one from which the Framers of the 14th amendment
expected the most. Id.
58. See JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOUGH V. MARYLAND (G.
Gunther ed. 1969). In pseudonymous letters to the Philadelphia Union and
the Alexandria Gazette, Marshall defended his decision in McCullough by
repudiating any notion that the opinion contained "the most distant allusion
to any extension by construction of the powers of congress." Id. at 185 (em-
phasis added). Marshall further stated that although the Constitution granted
the judiciary the power to decide all questions arising under the Constitution,
"the exercise of it cannot be the assertion of a right to change that instrument."
Id. at 209.
59. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78; text at note 39
supra.
60. GOvERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 30, at 194, 196. Commenting
on the New York Constitution in 1787, Hamilton found that the words "due
process" had a "precise technical import" and were "only applicable to the
process and proceedings of the courts of justice." THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 35 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1962).
61. Debates on the fourteenth amendment began in 1866 in the 39th Con-
gress and ratification followed in 1868. Representative Bingham of Ohio, one
of the framers of the fourteenth amendment, attached to due process the mean-
ing that had been recognized by the courts, which was all but universally
procedural. J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 86
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(1965). See also B. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1942). Twiss
maintained that before 1866, due process had been generally regarded as a
procedural guarantee. Id. Another commentator noted that the term due
process, as found in virtually all of the state constitutions employing those
words in 1866, was to be found in a section of the constitution dealing with the
conduct of criminal trials and the rights of the accused. Shattuck, The True
Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in the Federal and State
Constitutions which Protect "Life, Liberty and Propefty," 4 HARV. L. REv. 365,
369 (1891).
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
63. Packer, The Aim of the Criminal Law Revisited: A Plea for a New
Look at "Substantive Due Process," 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 490, 491-92 (1971).
64. Representative Latham of West Virginia stated that the civil rights
bill covered exactly the same ground as the fourteenth amendment. 39th
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 26, at 2883. Professor Fairman more recently com-
mented on the relationship between § 1 of the fourteenth amendment and the
Civil Rights Act, stating that, throughout the debates on the amendment, "the
provisions of one are treated as though they were essentially identified with
those of the other." Fairman, supra note 41, at 44.
65. The Civil Rights Act guaranteed to blacks the enumerated rights and
the "equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens." Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 41 Stat.
27. See note 47 supra. For the remarks of several members of the 39th Con-
gress concerning the scope of rights under the Act, see GOVERNMENT BY JUDI-
ciARY, supra, note 30, at 170-71. The language proposed by Bingham in an
early version of the fourteenth amendment provided for equal protection "in
the rights of life, liberty and property." See Bickel, supra note 23, at 57.
Concerning this language, Bickel concluded that it was intended to protect
those rights specifically enumerated in the Civil Rights Act in light of the
"evils represented by the Black Codes, which were foremost in the minds of
all men." Id. The final draft of § 1 of the fourteenth amendment, which
adopted the Bingham formula, was not a subject of great debate in the House
and "became the subject of stock generalization: it was dismissed as embody-
ing and . . . 'constitutionalizing' the Civil Rights Act." Id. at 58.
66. Representative Shellabarger was a leading Radical of the 13th Con-
gress. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 30, at 170.
67. 39th CONG. GLOBE, supra note 26, at 1293.
68. Pari materia has been defined as: "Of the same matter; on the same
subject," that is, "laws pari materia must be construed with reference to each
other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1004 (5th ed. 1979).
69. See Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock
& Slaughterhouse Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 655 (C.C.D. La. 1870). Shortly after the
amendment's ratification, Justice Bradley noted:
[C]onsidering that the civil rights bill was enacted at the same session,
and but shortly before the presentation of the fourteenth amendment;
was reported by the same committee; was in pari materia; and was
probably intended to reach the same object, we are disposed to
modify our opinion in this respect, and to hold, . . . that the first
section of the bill covers the same ground as the fourteenth amend-
ment, at least so far as the matters involved in this case are concerned.
Id.
70. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 30, at 163-65.
71. 39th CONG. GLOBE, supra note 26, at 705.
72. Representative Stevens of Pennsylvania was the chairman of the House
section of nine members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. Van
Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" to Vote, and the Under-
standing of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 33, 45.
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73. 39th CONG. GLOBE, supra note 26, at 3148.
74. Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908) (Holmes, J.,
sitting as Circuit Justice).
75. Id. Justice Holmes stated that "[t]he Legislature has the power to
decide what the policy of the law shall be, and if it has intimated its will,
however indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed." Id. See
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903).
76. Kutler, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amendment: A History or Ahis-
torical?, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511, 512 (1979).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 513.
79. Id.
80. See Berger, Constructive Contempt: A Post-Mortem, 9 U. CHI. L. REV.
602 (1942).
81. Id. at 602-05. The article criticized Justice Black's opinion in Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), which found that the well-entrenched sum-
mary power of courts over publications in contempt of court was curtailed by
the first amendment, and later by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 602.
82. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Justice McReynolds read
the concept of liberty in the fourteenth amendment broadly as including a
number of implicit property rights, and limited the government's ability to
legislate in a way which would affect these rights. Id. at 399.
83. See notes 94-107 and accompanying text infra.
84. See JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOUGH V. MARYLAND, supra
note 58, at 190-91. Marshall cautioned that "[t]he peculiar circumstances of
the moment may render a measure more or less wise, but cannot render it
more or less constitutional." Id.
85. See II W. CROSSXEY, POLInCS AND THE CONSTITUTION 969 (1953).
Crosskey noted that two or more unreported New Hampshire cases arose under
the Ten Pound Act, which provided for the trial of actions on debts before a
justice of the peace without a jury. Id. According to newspaper reports of
the cases, the New Hampshire courts viewed the Ten Pound Act as uncon-
stitutional and not binding upon them. Id. Crosskey also referred to a Rhode
Island case, Trevett v. Weeden (noted only in a pamphlet at the time),
wherein the defendant appealed a criminal conviction, which had been tried
without a jury and in which the court refused to take jurisdiction of the case
due to the unconstitutional statute involved. Id. at 967-68.
86. See Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 42 (1787) (holding a state act
which directed the courts to dismiss any action that might be brought to recover
lands under a confiscation act unconstitutional). For a discussion of the en-
suing legislative action against the Bayard court judges, see II W. CROSSKEY,
supra note 85, at 973-74. For other instances of disapproval of judicial actions
leading to the impeachment of failure to reappoint judges, see id. at 964, 968
& 970.
87. Professor Robert McCloskey noted that James Wilson was one of six
men whose signature appeared on both the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution, and that he made a significant contribution to the
Federal Convention. I THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 2 (R. McCloskey ed.
1967). The Philadelphia "Lectures on Law" were given while Wilson was
serving both as a Justice of the Supreme Court and a professor at the College
of Philadelphia. Id. at 28-29.
88. See R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. THE SUPREME COURT 30 (1969), citing I
J. WILsON, THE WoRs oF JAMES WILSON 398 (1804).
89. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton), at 576 (Lippincott & Co. ed.
1873), quoting I C. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS 186 (5th ed. 1773). Hamil-
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ton, in comparing the judiciary with the executive branch noted that the
judiciary "has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction
either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active
resolution whatsoever." THE FEDERALIST, supra, at 575.
90. See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958). Judge Hand expressed
doubts that the Constitutional Convention would have voted as it did had there
been any awareness that the courts would have power to invalidate acts of
Congress. Id. at 7.
91. See A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT (1976). Cox could find no conclusive proof to support the notion that
the judiciary was given supremacy over constitutional questions in the original
charter. Id. at 15-16.
92. See L. LEVY, ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1972).
According to Levy, "decisive evidence" concerning whether judicial review was
originally intended "cannot be marshalled to prove what the framers had in
mind." Id. at 24-25.
93. See R. BERGER, supra note 88, at 198-284.
94. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 73
(1911).
95. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 94, at 97-98.
96. Id., vol. 2, at 73.
97. Id., vol. 1, at 108.
98. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 30, at 307.
99. Id., quoting Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception
of American Law, 1780-1820, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
292 (1971) (emphasis by Professor Berger).
100. 1 C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 152 (Rev. ed. 1899).
101. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 89, at 576. See 1 C. MONTESQUIEU,
supra note 100, at 152.
102. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 89, at 579.
103. See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Con-
stitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129, 135 (1893).
104. See L. HAND, supra note 90, at 31, 66. Hand acknowledged the
Court's role as final arbiter in determining whether a department had over-
stepped the bounds of its authority, but emphasized that each department and
the states, within their prescribed borders, should "be free from interference."
Id. at 31. Hand further stated that judicial review of an order or statute that
fell outside a grant of power should not involve review of how the power is
exercised. Id. at 66.
105. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., con-
curring).
106. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 89, at 581-82.
107. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 89, at 599.
108. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (holding the
Missouri Compromise unconstitutional on the ground that Congress could not
bar slavery from the territories).
109. See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858) (reversing an
order by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to set aside the federal commitment
of a fugitive slave); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (holding
Pennsylvania law which prohibited the act of seizing and removing a fugitive
slave by his master unconstitutional).
110. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 30, at 222, quoting H. GRAHAM,
EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION 447-48 (1968). Representative Stevens discussed "the
infamous sentiment that damned the late Chief Justice to everlasting fame; and,
I fear, to everlasting fire." 39th CONG. GLOBE, supra note 26, at 75.
1980-81]
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111. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. This section states: "The Congress
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
112. Lusky, supra note 21 at 408.
113. Id. at 406.
114. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REV.
119, 158. Kelly stated that "[t]his involves the justices in a degree of political
activism rivaled only in the days of Dred Scott, Pollock, and Lochner. Id.
115. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U.L. REv. 204, 224-25 (1980).
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, para. 2.
117. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845).
118. Id. at 245 (citation omitted).
119. See Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; note 124 and accompany-
ing text infra.
120. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440 (1850).
121. Id. at 448-49.
122. For a discussion of several congressional attempts to remove juris-
diction from the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, see G. GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55-56 (10th ed. 1980). One such
proposal was the Helms amendment, which, had it been successful, would have
removed jurisdiction over suits challenging voluntary school prayers from the
federal courts. Id. at 56.
123. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 26 (3d ed.
1976).
124. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 stat. 27 (emphasis added). Section
three of the Act also provided that the United States district courts would have
concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts of the United States of all civil
and criminal actions affecting persons who are unable to enforce those rights
secured by section one in the state courts. Id. The rationale supporting the
extension of exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts is reflected in a comment
by McKee of Kentucky, asking "[w]here is your court of justice in any southern
state where the black man can secure protection?" 39th CONG. GLOBE, supra
note 26, at 653.
125. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
126. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Under this section, the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court is limited to "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party ..
127. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
128. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) (dismissing appeal on the basis of repeal
of jurisdiction by Congress). See also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,
567-68 (1962).
129. Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001,
1005 (1965).
130. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
131. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
132. Id. at 345. justice Strong, writing for the Court, emphasized that it
was the power of Congress which was enlarged by virtue of § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment.
133. See Berger, supra note 19, at 350-53.
134. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 525 (1872).
135. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3568 (1870).
136. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 897 (1872) (emphasis added).
137. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); see note 108 supra.
138. See Berger, supra note 19, at 350-51.
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